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Quebec, Canada, and the Glorious Revolution 
John Remington GRAHAM* 
The theory of secession in the United States, as acknowleged by New 
England during the War of 1812 and by the South during the American Civil 
War, is traced to authentic historical roots, and freshly reexpounded so as 
to permit renewed consideration of the wisdom of James Buchanan and the 
error of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and 1861. 
The British North America Act of 1867 (Constitution Act of 1867) is 
then viewed against Sir John Macdonald's misinterpretation of the Ameri-
can Civil War. 
Events leading to the present constitutional impasse between Quebec 
and Canada are reexamined, so as to reveal the underlying cause. 
The author expounds the principle of the Glorious Revolution, as 
explained by Sir William Blackstone, and shows why, in light of the consti-
tutional custom giving legitimacy to the reign of William and Mary, and the 
present constitutional order of Canada under Elizabeth II, a reference to 
the Supreme Court cannot resolve the crisis now erupting in Quebec. 
The resolution of this crisis can only be accomplished by statesman-
ship, buttressed by patriotism and courage. 
La théorie de la sécession des états sous la constitution américaine, 
telle que reconnue par la Nouvelle Angleterre durant la guerre de 1812 et 
par le Sud durant la guerre civile américaine, est retracée jusqu'à ses 
origines historiques authentiques et mise à jour afin de reconsidérer la 
sagesse de James Buchanan et l'erreur d'Abraham Lincoln en 1860 et 1861. 
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L'Acte d'Amérique du Nord britannique de 1867 (la Loi constitu-
tionelle de 1867) est ensuite étudié à Vencontre de l'interprétation erronée 
qu'a fatt Sir John Macdonald de la guerre de sécession aux États-Unis. 
Les événements menant à l'actuelle impasse constitutionnelle entre le 
Québec et le Canada sont revus à nouveau de façon à en révéler la cause 
sous-jacente. 
L'auteur examine le principe de la Révolution anglaise de 1688-1689, 
tel qu 'expliqué par Sir William Blackstone, et démontre pourquoi, à la 
lumière de la coutume constitutionnelle légitimant le règne de Guillaume 
d'Orange et Mary, et par extension de l'ordre constitutionnel du Canada 
sous Elizabeth II, un renvoi à la Cour suprême ne peut pas résoudre la crise 
actuelle du Québec. Une solution à cette crise peut être élaborée unique-
ment par l'habilité politique des chefs d'État, étayée de patriotisme et de 
courage. 
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1. Secession and the American Constitution 
On August 8, 1787, the debates of the Philadelphia Convention turned 
once again to the question of how representatives should be apportioned 
among the several States in the lower house of the Congress. It was sup-
posed that the problem was how to develop a durable formula, both practi-
cal and just over long political ages. 
Nathaniel Gorham arose to speak. He was a statesman of excellent 
reputation from Massachusetts. He had served as a president of the United 
States under the Articles of Confederation. He had been the chairman of the 
committee of the whole in the Philadelphia Convention, as a presiding 
officer second only to George Washington. 
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Gorham did not think that the United States were or should be more 
than a practical and cooperative arrangement for peaceful coexistence and 
mutual defense among those free, sovereign, and independent States which 
extended over that part of North America lying to the east of the Mississippi 
River, to the the north of Spanish Florida, and to the south of the huge 
stretches then controlled by the British Crown. He expected the continental 
situation to modify naturally over coming years. In this light, it is not 
surprising that he frankly asked : « Can it be supposed that this vast country, 
including the western territory will one hundred and fifty years hence, be 
one nation 71 » 
It is sufficiently evident that the delegates attending the Philadelphia 
Convention did not believe they represented a fully integrated Nation2, nor 
did they believe that they proposed an indissoluable Union, as may be 
conveniently illustrated from a great multitude of available records. 
Judge Edmund Pendleton served as President of the Virginia Con-
vention which adopted the United States Constitution for his State. In 
answering those who claimed that the new federal government might 
oppress the people of Virginia and other States, Pendleton predicted what 
would happen if the federal government were usurped by those unfriendly 
to Virginia, her people, and her welfare : « Who shall dare resist the people ? 
No, we will assemble in convention, wholly recall our delegated powers, or 
reform them to prevent such abuse, and punish those servants who have 
perverted powers, and designed for our happiness to their own emo-
lument3 ». 
1. Quoted in Madison's Notes : J. ELLIOT (ed.), Debates on the Federal Constitution, Vol. 5, 
2d ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1859), at 392 and in M. FERRAND (ed.), 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Vol. 2,2d ed. (New Haven : Yale university 
Press, 1937), Vol. 2, at 221. 
2. King George III conceded American independence in the first article of the Treaty of 
Paris by him approved on September 3, 1783 : «His Britannic Majesty acknowledges 
the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign, 
and independent States». — H.S. COMMAGER (ed.), Documents of American History, 
Vol. 1,9th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1973) at 117. In Ware v. Hyton, 3 
Dallas 199 at 224 (U.S. 1798), Justice Samuel Chase, a signer of the Declaration of 
American Independence, held that the document was a « declaration, not that the united 
colonies jointly, in a collective capacity, were independent States, but that each of them 
was a sovereign and independent State,—that is, that each of them had a right to govern 
itself by its own authority, and its own laws, without any control from any other power 
on earth ». 
3. J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 3, at 37 (June 5, 1788). 
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Again, James Madison attended as a federalist delegate to the Virginia 
Convention. He had been so prominent as one of the framers in the Phila-
delphia Convention that he is often called the «father of the American 
constitution ». In answering those who « expressed fears that the new Union 
might become dangerous, Madison answered : «If we be dissatisfied with 
the national government, if we choose to renounce it, this is an additional 
safeguard to our defence4 ». 
In the Virginia Convention, the ratification of the new instrument of 
Union was made subject to the express caveat « that the powers granted 
under the Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, 
may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their 
injury or oppression5 ». The phrase « people of the United States » was 
understood to mean the people of New Hamphsire, of Massachusetts, of 
Rhode Island, of Connecticut, of New York, of New Jersey, etc., as appears 
plainly in the records of the Philadelphia Convention6. This point becomes 
even clearer from Madison's statement in The Federalist, No. 39, where 
he said that the United States Constitution came into effect by the « ratifi-
cation of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each 
State, the authority of the people themselves7». The right of a State to 
secede from the Union derives from the principle, stated by John Marshall 
as a federalist delegate to the Virginia Convention, « It is the people who 
give power, and can take it back8 ». 
Alexander Hamilton attended the Philadelphia Convention, and had 
tried to secure adoption of a centralized and unitary government of the 
4. Id., at 414-415 (June 14,1788). 
5. Id., at 656 (June 27, 1788). Similar language is found in the ratifications of New York, 
J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 1, at 327 (July 26,1788), and Rhode Island, Id., at 
334 (May 29, 1790). 
6. The language of the preamble, corresponding to the words in the first article of the Treaty 
of Paris, defining the United States as several States, each identified by name, was 
introduced by the committee on detail on August 6, was quickly adopted without dissent 
on August 7, and was then recast by the com mittee on style, having no power to make 
any substantive changes, so as to make reference to the United States, on September 
12, in which form the preamble was approved on September 17, 1787, as appears in 
Madison's Notes, J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 5, at 376, 382, 536 and 558; 
M. FERRAND (éd.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 2, at 177,196, 565, 590, 651. 
7. Mentor Edition 1961, p. 243. In the Virginia Convention, Madison defined the «people 
of the United States » as the parties to the new constitution, mentioned in the preamble, 
as the «people—but not the people composing one great body, but the people as 
composing thirteen sovereignties».—J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 3, at 94 (June 6, 
1788). 
8. Id., at 233 (June 10, 1788). 
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United States, relegating the several States to mere administrative prov-
inces. Yet, in The Federalist, No. 9, Hamilton acknowledged the new Union 
established by the United States Constitution as a « confederate republic », 
which he defined by quoting from a standard translation of the Baron de 
Montesquieu : « The confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates 
preserve their sovereignty9 ». 
Enough has been said to explain why, during the War of 1812, the 
Hartford Convention believed it lawful and proper to suggest secession of 
the States of New England from the United States10, — and why in 1860 and 
1861 the people of the southern States felt they were merely exercising their 
established constitutional rights in electing conventions which withdrew 
their States from the Union1 '. 
Why were the people of the southern States tired of their « glorious 
Union» with the North? The truest expression of this sentiment was 
written by the editor of the Richmond Examiner after the surrender of Lee's 
army at Appomattox : 
Foreigners have made a curious and unpleasant observation of a certain exaggera-
tion of the American mind, an absurd conceit that was never done asserting the 
unapproachable excellence of its country in all things [...] But it is to be remarked 
that this boastful disposition of mind, this exaggerated conceit, was particularly 
Yankee. It belonged to the garish civilization of the North. It was Daniel Webster 
who wrote, in a diplomatic paper, that America was « the only great republican 
power». It was Yankee orators who established the Fourth-of-July school of 
rhetoric, exalted the American eagle, and spoke of the Union as the last, best gift 
to man. This afflatus had but little place among the people of the South. Their 
civilization was a quiet one, and their characteristic as a people has always been [a] 
sober estimate of the value of men and things [..J12 
9. Mentor Edition 1961, p. 75. 
10. The people of New England ardently opposed the War of 1812, because they enjoyed 
booming commerce with Great Britain and Canada. They refused to send their militia 
against York (Toronto) and Quebec. And the American war effort was so mismanaged 
that the people of New England saw the need to defend themselves as Wellington's 
veterans landed in Canada. Hence the Hartford Convention of 1814-1815, which was one 
of the most remarkable, yet least understood meetings in the history of the United States. 
The account of the secretary of the meeting is T. DWIGHT, History of the Hartford 
Convention, (Boston : Russell, Odiome & Co., 1833). 
11. In my opinion, the finest exposition of the right of secession, as upheld by the people 
of the South in their war for independence, is found in the first volume of A. STEPHENS, 
Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States (Philadelphia, Pa : National Pub. 
Co,, 1868), reprinted by Sprinkle Publications 1994. Professor Clyde Wilson recommends 
A. BLEDSOE, IS Davis a Traitor ? (Baltimore : Innes & Co., 1866), reprinted by Fletcher 
& Fletcher. 
12. E. POLLARD, The Lost Cause (New York: Treat & Co., 1867), reprinted by Bonanza 
Books 1974, pp. 51-52. 
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The animating spirit of the people of the southern States was a desire 
to preserve their culture and their way of life from being absorbed into a 
« great American melting pot » which they did not want13. 
From the southern point of view, the North adored the Union only 
because of its control of the legal and political apparatus. The southern 
people feared that this power, in the hands of politicians who did not 
understand their culture, would be abused to exploit their rights. 
Another critical insight into the motives behind the American Civil War 
has been provided by Congressman Charles A. Lindbergh Sr. of Minnesota. 
Lindbergh revealed the contents of a so-called « Hazard Circular » which in 
1862 was distributed among wealthier classes of the North. It said : 
The great debt that capitalists will see to it made out of the war, must be used as a 
means to control the volume of money. To accomplish this the bonds must be used 
as a banking basis. We are now waiting for the secretary of the treasurey to make 
this recommendation to Congress. It will not do to allow the greenback as it is 
called, to circulate as money any length of time, as we cannot control that. But we 
can control the bonds and through them the bank issues'4. 
13. For those who believe that the American Civil War was fought over slavery, it should 
be pointed out that President Abraham Lincoln did not think so. See, e.g., his letter of 
August 22, 1862, to Horace Greeley, found in H.S. COMMAGER (ed.), op. cit., note 2, 
Vol. 1, at 417-418. Honest scholars may read the neglected «other side of the story» 
about this « peculiar institution » of the Old South in R.L. DABNEY, Defence of Virginia 
and the South (New York : Hale & Son, 1867), reprinted by Sprinkle Publications 1991. 
Viewed in this light, the institution was virtually indistinguishable from villenage in 
England, as described by SIR W. BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
Vol. 2, (Christian Edition, 1765) at 90-98. In 1861, slavery was a quickly dying institution 
in the South, incapable of lasting much beyond the beginning of the 20th century, as 
appears in C. RAMSDELL, « Natural Limits of Slavery Expansion », Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, (1929), Vol. 16, at 151-171. Few have ever studied the edifying truth 
about the southern abolition movement, led by disciples of Thomas Jefferson. See, e.g., 
J.C. ROBERT, Road from Monticello (Duke Univ. Press, 1941). Nor is it generally under-
stood that the conquest by « armies of freedom » from the North led to mass deaths of 
black people in the South, as appears in the testimony of Judge William Sharkey 
(reconstruction governor of Mississippi appointed by President Andrew Johnson) before 
the 39th Congress in the spring of 1866. See H.L. TREFOUSSE (ed.), Background for 
Radical Reconstruction: Congressional Hearings, (Boston : Little Brown & Co., 1970) 
at 27-29. 
14. Quoted and discussed in C.A. LINDBERGH, Banking and Currency and the Money Trust, 
(Washington, D.C. : National Capitol Press 1913), at 101-104. The legislation favored by 
the Hazard Circular took shape in the National Bank Act of 1863,12 U.S. Stat. L. 670, 
the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 U.S. Stat. L. Ill, the State Bank Note Act of 1865,13 
U.S. Stat. L. 484, the State Bank Note Act of 1866,14 U.S. Stat. L. 146, and, ultimately, 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 38 U.S. Stat. L. 251. 
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The idée fixe of « one nation indivisible » in the United States did not 
come from the founding fathers of the country, but from power brokers and 
financiers on the winning side of the American Civil War. 
It so happens that in 1851 Texas had ceded her claims to what became 
the New Mexico Territory in exchange for $10,000,000 in federal bonds. 
When secession and war came ten years later, the civilian government sold 
the bonds to buy medicines and other supplies for wounded soldiers. After 
the last confederate troops surrendered, representatives and senators from 
ten southern States were all excluded from Congress, because they believed 
their States had die right to secede from the Union.The northern rump 
overrode the veto of President Andrew Johnson, and imposed martial law 
in time of profound peace over those southern States, treating them as 
conquered territories. 
In this setting the military governor of Texas brought suit in the name 
of the State in the case of Texas v. White15, invoking the original jurisdiction 
of the United States Supreme Court, and seeking an injunction enjoining 
those holding the federal bonds transferred to the State in 1851 from nego-
tiating them further, and directing return thereof to the public treasury of 
Texas. In order to invoke original jurisdiction,Texas had to be a State of the 
Union. A motion was made to dismiss on the ground that Texas was not 
then a State. 
Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase denied the motion, and allowed the case 
to proceed. The old Confederation, he said, was by express terms « per-
petual », which is certainly true. And the new Union, he observed, was by 
express terms « a more perfect Union », which is also true beyond doubt. 
And because there was a perpetual Union made more perfect, Chase argued, 
the United States were « indestructible Union of indestructible States ». 
Texas, it was concluded, always was and remained a State. Therefore, 
original jurisdiction could be invoked. But Texas, was usurped between 
1861 and 1865, it was said, and thus the bonds sold were not sold at all. 
This opinion is pure sophistry and contradicts itself. Lord Camden 
would have said that Chase's pronouncement is « not bad law, but no law at 
all16». 
The old Confederation was perpetual, as most corporations are per-
petual, which means that they exist until dissolved. But the old Confedera-
tion was, after all, dissolved, and it was dissolved without the consent of all 
the States, even though the articles stipulated that amendment required 
15. Texas v. White, 7 Wallace 700 (U.S. 1869). 
16. See Lord Camden in Rex v. Wilkes, 95 Eng. Rep. 737 (C. P. 1763). Cf. SIR W. BLACK-
STONE, op. cit., note 13, Vol. 1. 
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assent of all of the States. The new Union is undoubtedly more perfect, 
because it was established by the people of each of the several States, sitting 
in convention as sovereign powers, whereas the old Confederation was 
established only by legislative acts of the several States. The new Union is 
also more perfect, because it works as a functioning government, whereas 
the old Confederation proved to be dysfunctional after the Battle of York-
town. 
Chase's conclusion was a spectacular non sequitur in history and law, 
which demonstrably defied the meaning clearly intended by the framers of 
1787. 
But there must have been an overwhelming fatefulness in Chase's 
mind. The country, then having had a population of about thirty-one million, 
had suffered a million casualties in combat, and had lost perhaps another 
half million black people from starvation. This enormous conflict generated 
an expenditure amounting to something like three-fourths of the assessed 
value of all taxable property in the country, mounted an inconceivable 
national debt, and turned over a major part of the system of banking and 
currency to a network of domestic and foreign investors. In this situation, 
Chase could not admit from the bench that the war, which he had helped to 
prosecute as a member of Lincoln's cabinet, was after all illegal. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Robert Grier rests on a sounder kind 
of realism. A State, according to the established law of the country, is an 
institution which sends representatives and senators to Congress17, and 
Texas then sent no representatives and senators to Congress. The question 
of secession, he said truthfully, had been tried and determined by battle18, 
and, whether just or unjust, the result was beyond judicial competence to 
deny or undo. The question, therefore, was political, not legal, hence non-
justiciable, and, in his view, the court should have simply dismissed for want 
of original jurisdiction. Grier's approach was surely right. His view was 
more pragmatic, more logical, and supported by good authority. 
2. The British North America Act of 1867 
Sir John Macdonald is one of the political legends of Canada. Certainly 
he played a decisive role in the Charlottetown and Quebec Conferences in 
1864. He believed that the distribution of sovereignty among the several 
States of the American Union, explaining not only the residual powers of 
17. In Hepburn v. Ellsey, 2 Cranch 452 (U.S. 1804), it was so held. 
18. In the Prize Cases, 2 Black 265 (U.S.I 863), it was held that a state of war existed between 
the government of the Union and the seceding States. 
J. R. GRAHAM Constitution et sécession 1023 
the several States, but the right of each and every State to secede, was the 
essential cause of the American Civil War. 
Given the way he viewed the American Civil War, it is not surprising 
that Macdonald developed a radically different theory of federalism in the 
British North America Act of 1867. 
Whereas Amendment X of the United States Constitution says that all 
powers not granted to the government of the Union are reserved to the 
governments and people of the several States, Section 91 of the British 
North America Act of 1867 says that the dominion Parliament has power to 
make all laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada, save as 
otherwise stipulated in favor of the several provincial Legislatures. 
Whereas the Preamble and Article VII of the United States Constitu-
tion say that the federal government derives its authority from conventions 
of the people in and of the several States—i. e., thirteen distinct fountains 
of sovereignty which ratified in from 1788 through 1790, and which have 
since become fifty such fountains—, the Preamble of the British North 
America Act of 1867 clearly says that the instrument of confederation in 
Canada derives from the unified root of sovereign power in the imperial 
Parliament at Westminster. 
Given these contrasts with the intended meaning of the American 
constitution, it is plain enough that there is not now, nor has there ever been 
a formal or created legal mechanism for unilateral secession of a province 
from the dominion under the organic statutes comprising fundamental law 
in Canada. 
3. Macdonald's Mistake 
In truth, Macdonald misunderstood the American Civil War. On De-
cember 3,1860, President James Buchanan said to Congress : 
The fact is that our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented 
by the blood of citizens shed in a civil war. If it cannot live in the affections of the 
people, it must one day perish. Congress possesses many means of preserving it by 
conciliation, but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force19. 
Buchanan worked tirelessly, using diplomacy until the very last hours 
of his presidency. Many patriotic southerners worked with him, as he 
promoted rational cooperation among the several States. 
On March 4,1861, President Abraham Lincoln said in his first inaugural 
address : 
19. H.S. COMMAGER (ed.), op. cit., note 2, Vol. 1, at 369. 
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No State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union [...] Resolves 
and ordinances to that effect are legally void [...] The Union is unbroken ; and, to 
the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins 
me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States20. 
Using the mistaken pretext that a more perfect Union is necessarily an 
indissoluable Union, Lincoln plunged the country into the most brutal war 
of his century after only thirty-nine days in office, converting fraternal love 
into bitter hatred, and causing extreme injury to the civilization of the 
United States. The tragic circumstances of his death, causing deep grieving 
far and wide for many years, cannot erase Lincoln's gigantic blunder. 
Macdonald did not understand this lesson of history, but Canada must 
not fail to appreciate it today. Incantations about the rule of law will not 
work. Only statesmanship works. 
4. The Canadian Charter and Quebec 
Because the old British North America Act of 1867 never included an 
amending formula, the many changes in that instrument before 1982 were 
all accomplished by acts of the imperial Parliament on petition of the 
dominion Parliament. It was generally accepted in London and Ottawa, 
especially after the Statute of Westminster 193121, that the mother country 
should graciously acquiesce as a mere « legislative trustee » for Canada, 
whenever a proper request was made. 
The Canada Act of 1982 terminated this old formality used in the past 
for amending the fundamental law of Canada, changed the names of the 
several British North America Acts to the Constitution Acts, and added a 
Constitution Act of 1982, which ordained an entrenched Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, and authorized several formulas for amending the 
fundamental law of Canada by the dominion Parliament acting alone or with 
some or all of the provincial Legislatures. It is important to recall how this 
Canada Act of 1982 was pushed through the imperial Parliament. 
20. Id., at 386. 
21. Section 4 provided, «No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the 
commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion, as part 
of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that that Dominion 
has requested and consented to the enactment thereof». Section 7(1) said, « Nothing in 
this Act shall be deemed to apply to the repeal, amendment, or alteration of the British 
North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or to any order, rule, or regulation thereunder». It 
appears from the proceedings of the dominion-provincial conference of 1931 leading to 
Section 7(1) that the provision was inserted, not to allow the imperial Parliament on its 
own initiative to amend the fundamental law of Canada, but to allow the development 
of procedures and conventions in Canada on applications for constitutional amendment. 
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The fundamental law of Canada includes not only organic statutes, but 
also a large body of constitutional customs and conventions, which are 
unwritten but understood, and often more important than anything in posi-
tive enactments. 
These constitutional customs and conventions are marvelous in their 
operation, and have served to correct otherwise shortsighted or unworkable 
provisions in organic statutes, so much so that the British North America 
Act of 1867 (now the Constitution Act of 1867) really does not mean what it 
says. 
The distinction between constitutional customs and constitutional con-
ventions is not as precise as law students and academicians might like. 
Constitutional customs are organic rules which activate and perpetuate the 
government, are part of the common law taken as a body of legal custom 
built upon and consistent with natural law and right reason, and are some-
times recognized or settled in judicial decisions and enforced by judicial 
writs. Constitutional conventions, by contrast, are organic rules of political 
interaction between institutions of government, but are not really part of 
jurisprudence or enforced by judicial writs, although courts sometimes give 
them notice. 
It is sufficient to observe here that many rules of good government in 
Canada are not written down in some statute book, but are determined by 
constitutional conventions which are established by political precedent, 
considered obligatory by leading statesmen, and founded on good reasons22. 
Prior the Canada Act of 1982, constitutional conventions limited the 
right of the dominion Parliament to petition the imperial Parliament for 
statutory amendments to the fundamental law of Canada. 
John Diefenbaker was the prime minister in Ottawa whose government 
gave the country the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960, which was an act of 
the dominion Parliament, subject to legislative repeal or suspension for 
good cause : it was eventually read as not only a rule of interpretation, but 
as a rule rendering federal statutes inoperative23. 
When he was asked whether a charter of freedoms or bill of rights could 
be entrenched in the fundamental law of Canada, so as to restrict and annul, 
22. See, e.g., E.C.S. WADE and G. PHILLIPS, Constitutional Law, 8th ed. (London : Longman, 
1970) at 11-13,79-80, also H. BRUN and G. TREMBLAY, Droit Constitutionnel, Cowansville, 
Éditions Yvon Biais, 1987, pp. 45-49. A single precedent, in which a principle is acknow-
ledged by a political leader for a very good reason, is enough to establish a constitutional 
convention. See, e.g., SIR I. JENNINGS, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London : 
University of London Press, 1959) at 136. 
23. As held by the majority in R. c. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282. 
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not only federal legislation, but the legislation of all ten provinces, Diefen-
baker made it absolutely clear that (whatever principle might govern some 
other subject matter) such a charter of freedoms or bill of rights, because it 
modifies authority to enact statutes, could not be consummated without the 
unanimous consent of all ten provincial Legislatures24. 
Up to the day Diefenbaker spoke on this question in the dominion 
Parliament, every petition to the imperial Parliament to modify the law-
making powers of all provincial Legislatures was withheld or not granted 
until unanimous consent of all of provincial Legislatures was obtained, nor 
was there ever a case in which the law-making powers of any provincial 
Legislature were altered without first obtaining its consent. 
The evidence was, therefore, lucid, as distinguished constitutional law-
yers and attorneys general held, that a constitutional convention forbade 
application to the imperial Parliament for ah amendment adding an en-
trenched charter of freedoms or bill of rights restraining both the provinces 
and the dominion of Canada, unless unanimous consent were first obtained. 
« Diefenbaker's rule », if we may call it such, was a sagacious maxim, 
demanding restraint on the ambition of some future government of Canada 
from doing that which might antagonize a significant part of the population, 
by slighting their elected legislators, in this way inducing political or consti-
tutional crisis. Even if this convention were judicially misunderstood or 
politically twisted, bad results anticipated from not following it were not 
less certain to follow, and these bad consequences are the main sanction 
against disobedience. 
Professor Carroll Quigley rightly stated a melancholy truth: «The 
conventions of the system have been highly praised, and described as 
binding upon men's actions. They are largely praiseworthy, but their bind-
ing character is much overrated25 ». They are as binding as politicians are 
wise and reputable. 
When the bill proposing what eventually became the Canada Act of 
1982 was pending in the dominion Parliament, then controlled by the liberal 
government of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, the National Assembly of Quebec was 
controlled by the separatist government of René Lévesque. It was clear that 
Lévesque's government would never consent to an entrenched charter of 
freedoms or bill of rights restraining the National Assembly of Quebec, at 
least not unless important reservations were first inserted26. 
24. House of Commons Debates (1960), at 5648 and 5469. 
25. C. QUIGLEY, Tragedy and Hope, (New York : MacMillan Co., 1966) at 462. 
26. The type of concerns involved are discussed by H. BRUN, «Droits collectifs et droits 
individuels : un difficile équilibre», Contact, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1990), pp. 33-35. 
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The opposition by the government of Quebec was not opposition to an 
enumeration of human rights, for the province already had an impressive 
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne : rather it was feared that judicial 
interpretation of such Canadian « freedoms » and « rights » would homoge-
nize Quebec's unique civilization into an amalgamated Canadian wholeness 
which the people of Quebec have never wanted, and will never want as long 
as they feel their identity as a French Nation in North America27. 
In Canada frequent resort is made to the judicial branch of govern-
ment by way of statutory references,—in effect, requests for advisory 
opinions28. In order to break the impasse, the governments of Quebec, 
Manitoba, and Newfoundland referred various related questions to their 
respective appellate courts, and from there the matter reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada, with every attorney general in the country present and 
arguing, in Reference on the Resolution to Modify the Constitution29. 
The most important question was whether a constitutional convention 
required consent of the provincial governments to a petition of the dominion 
Parliament to the imperial Parliament for adoption of what was to become 
die Canada Act of 1982. The answer given was in the affirmative, yet the 
court held that this consent did not have to be unanimous, as Diefenbaker 
had unequivocally said was needed for entrenching a charter of freedoms or 
27. In Montreal Tramways c. Léveillé, [1933] S.C.R. 456, it was found, under the civil code 
of Lower Canada that a human foetus is a legal person in private litigation. Cf. SIR 
W. BLACKSTONE, op. cit., note 13, Vol. 1, at 129-130. In this respect, the law of Quebec 
was far advanced over other jurisdictions of North America, which eventually came 
around, and recognized that a human fetus is a legal person in such situations. See, e.g., 
P. KEETON (ed.), Prosser and Keeton on the law of torts, (St-Paul, Minn. : West Pub. 
Co,, 1984) at 367-368. In Tremblay c. Daigle, [1989] R.J.Q. 1735 (Que. C.A.), it was again 
held in Quebec that a human fetus is a legal person in private litigation, but the judgment 
was reversed in Daigle c. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530, no doubt because of a ques-
tionable interpretation of the Canadian Charter in Morgentaler c. /?., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
See the unanswerable commentary on this error by P.-A. CREPEAU, «L'affaire Daigle 
et la Cour suprême du Canada», in E. CAPARROS (ed.), Mélanges Germain Brière, 
Montreal/Wilson & Lafleur, 1993, pp. 197-215. 
28. Unheard of in the United States, except under the express provisions in the constitutions 
of a few of the several States, as appears in the classic case of Muskrat v. United States, 
219 U. S. 346 (1911). The American idea of keeping the judiciary strictly out of political 
business can be traced back to the Philadelphia Convention. On June 6, 1787, Elbridge 
Gerry made a speech which defeated a proposal to allow judges to sit with the president 
in reviewing bills passed by the legislative branch. According to Madison's Notes, Gerry 
said that it would be unwise to allow the president to be « covered by the sanction and 
seduced by the sophistry of the judges».—J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 5, at 165 
and M. FERRAND (ed.), op. cit., note 1, at 139. 
29. Reference on the Resolution to Modify the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 7533 
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bill of rights as against all the provincial governments. Only « a substantial 
measure of provincial consent » was required. 
How the court managed to get around Diefenbaker's lucid statements, 
and other supporting evidence, still has many constitutional lawyers mysti-
fied. The court well stated the historical facts with fidelity to detail, then 
leaped for a conclusion which seemed to come out of nowhere. 
Following was a dominion-provincial conference of 1981. At the 
meeting, while Lévesque was asleep in his bed, Trudeau and his justice 
minister secured the agreement of the premiers of the other nine provinces. 
The necessary papers were ceremoniously signed. A beaming Trudeau 
announced to the press that he and his colleagues had accomplished work 
comparable to the work of the Philadelphia Convention. 
Interestingly, the delegates attending the Philadelphia Convention did 
not believe they were framing a constitution for North Carolina or Rhode 
Island if they chose to remain outside the Union, as they remained for some 
months after the inauguration of George Washington as president, or for 
Canada (what had been New France) which never did accept a formal 
invitation to join the United States30. 
Lévesque's government fought on, trying a tilt with windmills31, but 
was overwhelmed. 
Judicial pronouncements have done nothing whatever to convince the 
people of Quebec that they never had rights by constitutional convention or 
rules of honorable government to reject a charter of «freedoms» and 
« rights » they never wanted, that their cultural distinctness was not openly 
insulted by the rest of Canada, that they were not cunningly betrayed by a 
prime minister of the dominion and the premiers of nine provinces of 
Canada, and that they were not in effect made a colony of the rest of Canada 
under the Constitution Act of 1982. Nor have judicial pronouncements 
changed the facts of history. Nor can judicial pronouncements rectify the 
breach of faith and trust. 
30. Article XI of the Articles of Confederation provided : «Canada acceding to this Con-
federation, and joining in measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and 
entitled to all the advantages of this Union, but no other colony shall be admitted into 
the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States ». 
31. See especially Reference on the Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, 
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 793. 
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5. The Lake Meech Accord and the Charlottetown Accord 
It is sufficient here to say that the Meech Lake Accord was a gallant 
attempt by patriots and statesmen, Brian Mulroney, John Turner, Robert 
Bourassa, David Peterson, and Jeanne Sauvé among them, to repair the 
injury done by the imposition of a constitution upon Quebec over her 
protest by the rest of Canada. 
The Meech Lake Accord was a carefully brokered proposition for 
constitutional amendment, produced by the dominion provincial confer-
ence of 1987, signed by the premiers of all ten provinces and the prime 
minister of Canada. 
The most important item would have inserted a new Section 2 in the 
Constitution Act of 186732, containing two pithy but all-important subparts : 
(l)(b) which said, «The constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the recognition that Quebec constitutes within 
Canada a distinct society », and (3) which said, « The role of the legislature 
and government of Quebec to preserve the distinct identity of Quebec is 
affirmed33». 
If this item had been the only item in the Meech Lake Accord, it could 
have passed under Section 38 of the Constitution Act of 1982, upon proposal 
by the federal Parliament, and the assent of seven provincial Legislatures 
representing at least half the population of Canada. 
If the accord had been so simple, it might have quickly passed. Separa-
tism in Quebec would be politically dead. The country could then have given 
some attention to such other problems as reforming the dominion Senate34. 
32. In place of the old Section 2 of the British North America Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., 
U.K., c. 3 (hereinafter cited : « Constitution Act of 1867 ») which had been repealed in 
1893 by the Statute of 56-57 Victoria, Chapter 14. 
33. Notwith the assurances of six leading constitutional lawyers at the dominion-provincial 
conference of 1990, there is good reason to believe that the Meech Lake Accord would 
have conferred special legislative rights to Quebec for preservation of her unique heri-
tage, including special protection of the French language. While the Meech Lake Accord 
would not have granted any new power in express terms, the new proposed Section 
2(l)(b) and (3), read together with, say, Section 92(16) of the Constitution Act of 1867 
might have given the National Assembly of Quebec an implied discretion to enact 
legislation like Bill 101 (Charter of the French language, L.R.Q., c. C-l 1) wiihout resort 
to the Notwithstanding Clause in Section 33 of the Constitution Act of 1982, schedule 
B of Canada Act of 1982 (1982, U.K., c. 11), in effect reversing Ford c. Quebec (A.G.), 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. 
34. A large difficulty, which will probably take some years to solve in Canada. The compo-
sition of the United States Senate, as a key item in the Great Compromise, took up more 
time in the Philadelphia Convention than almost any other problem. Complaints about 
the Canadian Senate appear to be rooted in the fact that the body is an attempted copy 
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Unfortunately, other elements were fitted into the accord, and these 
elements included an item, not particularly controversial in itself, which, 
under Section 41 of the Constitution Act of 1982, required the assent of the 
dominion Parliament and all ten provincial Legislatures. 
A premier of Manitoba signed in 1987, promising the support of his 
government, and another premier of Manitoba signed in 1990, promising the 
support of his government. The government of Manitoba first failed to act, 
then allowed a one-man veto on a parliamentary technicality to prevent the 
measure from reaching the floor, causing the accord to die from expiration 
of time under Section 39 of the Constitution Act of 1982. 
A premier of Newfoundland signed in 1987, promising the support of 
his government, which then approved the accord soon thereafter, but then 
his government on his urging repealed its approval in 1990, although later in 
the year he again signed and again promised the support of his government, 
then on his urging his government rejected the accord a few days later. 
The people of Quebec saw what happened, and they deduced that they 
had been insulted and let down again. 
The Charlottetown Accord was an attempt to save the country from 
anticipated disintegration following the want on destruction of the Meech 
Lake Accord. The effort died because of over-exposure to the news media, 
which induced endless grandstanding at conferences. The undigested and 
wide-ranging proposals in the «final text» were submitted to a national 
vote. 
If the report of the committee of the whole in the Philadelphia Conven-
tion had been submitted to a general referendum in the United States in 
1787, it would and should have been voted down everywhere, which is what 
happened to the ill-fated Charlottetown Accord in the referendum of 1992. 
Adopting a constitution is by the nature of things a public act. But 
framing a constitution has always been a dry and technical business, as ideas 
are suggested, discussed, modified, rejected, and fit into place. Letting 
journalists into the process of framing is a certain recipe for disaster35. 
of the British House of Lords, which cannot be recreated or replicated by fundamental 
law in North America, as to which point insight may be found in the long speech of 
Charles Pinckney on June 25,1787, reported in Madison's Notes, J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., 
note 1, Vol. 5, at 233-238, M. FERRAND (éd.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 11, at 397-404, also in 
Yates' Minutes, J. ELLIOT (ed.), op. cit., note 1, Vol. 1, at 443-444, M. FERRAND (ed.), 
op. cit., note 1, Vol. 1, at 410-412. 
35. See the instructive anecdote on this point by William Pierce, one of the more obscure 
framers of the United States Constitution, reproduced in M. FERRAND (éd.), op. cit., 
note 1, Vol. 3, at 86-87. 
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6. The 1995 Referendum and Its Aftermath 
Nobody ought to be suprised that, after the Meech Lake Accord was 
sabotaged, and after Peterson, Turner, Sauvé, Mulroney, and Bourassa left 
public office, the people of Quebec elected strong separatists to guide their 
future : —Jacques Parizeau as premier of Quebec, and Lucien Bouchard as 
leader of the opposition Bloc québécois in the dominion Parliament, and 
now premier of Quebec. 
And nobody ought to be surprised that, in a second referendum on 
independence, proposed by Parizeau's government in 1995, the vote of the 
people of Quebec was 49.4 % « oui » and 51.6 % « non », which everybody 
knows (or should know) was an astonishing moral victory for separatism in 
Quebec, in the face of confused policies of Jean Chrétien as prime minister 
of Canada36. 
The fires of separatism are now more alive and well than ever in 
Quebec. There have been veiled or overt threats of taking territory from 
Quebec, of taking Canadian passports and money,—even shutting off elec-
tricity37—, but these remonstrations have only enhanced opinion, for want 
of a good alternative if nothing else, that Quebec ought to be a free, sover-
eign, and independent nation, with her own passports, her own currency and 
central bank, her own policy on trade and immigration, etc. 
36. Shortly after the 1995 referendum, the House of Commons in Ottawa passed a resolution 
acknowledging that Quebec is a distinct society because of her main language, unique 
culture, and civil law tradition. While this motion appears to establish a constitutional 
convention, so also did Diefenbaker's concession on an entrenched charter of freedoms 
or bill of rights, yet Quebec was no better for it when the moment of truth arrived at 
the dominion-provincial conference of 1981. Learned opinion in Quebec regards this 
motion as a mere illusion of reform. Chretien's government also pushed through a 
Constitutional Amendments Act of 1996, which, among other things, purports to give 
two or three provinces in western Canada, where ill-will against Quebec is rife at the 
moment, the power to veto amendments to the fundamental law of Canada, even where 
the «seven-fifty» formula in Section 38 of the Constitution Act of 1982 is applicable. 
This Act appears to be unconstitutional, and it may well complicate the hope of recon-
ciliation between Quebec and the rest of Canada. 
37. So says the current premier of Newfoundland, yet he adds, in sharp contrast to his 
predecessor who destroyed the Meech Lake Accord, that Quebec should be recognized 
as a distinct society « with generosity and without reservation. It is a small price to pay 
for national unity ». G. IP, « Tobin issues Churchill warning », Globe and Mail, (20 No-
vember 1996) 2A. Special exemptions or privileges to some states unusually situated, 
granted in order to achieve unity, is nothing new in the formation of confederacies : 
—e.g., in the German Empire (1871-1918), Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, each 
enjoyed special exemptions and privileges, as appears in J. BRYCE, The Holy Roman 
Empire, (London : MacMillan Co., 1911) at 483-485. 
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All else having failed, resort to litigation has been tried. In the nature of 
things, litigation cannot work, and it is unfair to expect the judiciary to 
remedy the situation. The judiciary can never avoid, by any holding, the bad 
consequences which have followed naturally as the inevitable sanction for 
disregarding Diefenbaker's paternal advice in 1960. 
During the public debate preceding the 1995 referendum, an expedient 
was attempted to dampen the ardor of the « oui » campaign by the ingenious 
suit brought before the Superior Court of Quebec, entitled Bertrand c. 
Begin?*. 
The suit was brought to secure an injunction enjoining Parizeau's 
government from spending public money for the referendum, and from 
passing laws for the purpose of effecting the unilateral separation of Quebec 
from Canada, if the vote on the referendum signified a majority sentiment 
for independence. 
In the United States, a suit of this kind surely would have been dis-
missed for lack of standing39, or as raising a « political » or nonjusticiable 
question40. In Canada, however, Section 24 of the Constitution Act of 1982 
has been read to give the judiciary much broader rights to adjudicate41. 
Justice Robert Lesage was certainly right in refusing an injunction 
which would have produced a most unfortunate reaction, and he was 
certainly right in what he declared by judgment:—that the legislation 
proposed by Parizeau's government, if enacted and consummated, would 
rupture and repudiate the existing constitutional order of Canada, and 
would take away the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
38. Bertrand c. Begin, [1995] R.J.Q. 2500 (C.S.). 
39. See, e.g.,Ashwander\. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 at 346-348 (1936), where 
it was said that a court should not decide a constitutional question, for want of standing, 
where the issue is prematurely raised in advance of the need to decide it, or where the 
question is framed more broadly than necessary, or where no injury is immediately 
threatened by the statute challenged (a fortiori where the statute is no longer operative, 
and has not been reenacted), or where any of several other conditions exist. 
40. See, e.g. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 at 485 (1923) where it was said that a 
court ought to avoid as nonjusticiable abstract questions of power and sovereignty. See 
also the classic case of Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 1 (U.S. .849)) where the courr avoided 
as nonjusticiable the question of which of two state governments engaged in civil war 
was legitimate : the most convincing reason given was that the question involved such 
practical enormity as to lie beyond the remedial power of the judiciary. 
41. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, [1969] 1 A.C. 645, relied upon in Bertrand's suit 
reported in Bertrand c. Begin, note 38,2500, the privy council of Great Britain addressed, 
as if it were a proper matter for judicial inquiry, the question of whether Ian Smith's 
government was the lawful government of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Some 
learned opinion holds that this decision went beyond traditional judicial restraints due 
to the highly unusual nature and posture of the case. 
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Lesage was correct in that there exists no statutory mechanism for 
unilateral secession of a province from the dominion of Canada. It is what 
he did not say that merits our notice. 
Nobody will deny the truth, stated by two eminent constitutional 
scholars, that 
Le préambule de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 indique en effet que la fédération 
canadienne, lors de sa création, a désiré « une constitution reposant sur le même 
principe que celle du Royaume-Uni ». Ainsi, le Canada fédéral appâtait avoir hérité 
à ce moment des grands principes du droit constitutionnel anglais tels qu'ils 
existaient alors42. 
And the British traditions which characterize the fundamental law of 
Canada—infused through the Preamble of the British North America Act 
of 1867—include most explicit acknowledgment of very proper but revo-
lutionary alterations in government, as needed to redress constitutional 
imbalance or injustice. 
In 1688 and 1689, events transformed the foundations of government in 
England. Constitutional custom demanded that no parliament meet without 
royal writ. Yet a meeting of commons and lords was called without royal 
writ, a constructive abdication of James II was declared, and the reign of 
William and Mary was ordained. And so became manifest the extraordinary 
forms of fundamental law in England, on which the Crown of Elizabeth II 
indisputably depends. The whole constitutional order of Canada rests on 
this « Glorious Revolution ». 
The principle of the Glorious Revolution is a constitutional custom, not 
a mere constitutional convention, yet it is of indefinite shape, and beyond 
judicial reasoning or treatment, because it is self-enforcing according to 
natural law, yet conferring upon the people in extraordinary situations a 
right to enjoy revolutionary modifications in their government peacefully 
and lawfully, without taking up arms. 
Sir William Blackstone said that this extraordinary principle of funda-
mental law operates notwithstanding all other statutes, customs, and con-
ventions, because «mankind will not be reasoned out of the feelings of 
humanity ». Then laying aside the particulars of the Glorious Revolution, 
and looking in years ahead, he said : 
It is not for us to say that any one or two of these ingredients would amount to such 
a situation, for there our precedent would fail us. In these, therefore, or other 
circumstances which a fertile imagination may furnish, since both law and history 
are silent, it behooves us to be silent too, leaving to future generations, whenever 
necessity and the safety of the whole shall require it, the exertion of those inherent 
42. H. BRUN and G. TREMBLAY, op. cit., note 22, p. 18. 
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though latent powers of society which no climate, no time, no constitution, no 
contract, can ever destroy or di>m'ms/i43.[Emphasis supplied] 
We have at the moment a political crisis in Quebec caused by imposi-
tion of a constitution upon the people over the protest of their elected 
government, and destruction of an accord in consideration of which their 
elected government was willing to signify approbation. The principle of the 
Glorious Revolution has, consequently, begun to operate in Quebec, and its 
demands cannot be enjoined by Canadian courts any more than the arrival 
of William of Orange could be enjoined by the chancellor of England, or the 
North Sea could be commanded by Cnut the Dane. 
The main difficulty with Lesage's judgment is that it rests essentially 
upon Rediffusion Ltd. v. Hong Kong44, in which the privy council of Great 
Britain suggested the colonial legislature of Hong Kong was so limited in 
its significance that parliamentary privileges otherwise immunizing its 
members did not apply, and that the judicial authority of the British Empire 
could, if circumstances were grave enough, interfere by injunction to enjoin 
any proceedings supposed to threaten the rule of law. 
Law students have always been taught that sovereign authority and 
rights are enjoyed by the provinces of Canada45. Yet Quebec was effectively 
reduced to the status of a colony by the dominion-provincial conference of 
1981. Those responsible for this fait accompli may deny it. Yet now, confir-
matory of the way the Canada Act of 1982 was pushed through, the National 
Assembly of Quebec has been judicially treated as if it were a mere colonial 
legislature in practical fact. 
Since the 1995 referendum, Guy Bertrand has continued his efforts 
before the Superior Court of Quebec to secure an injunction against the 
government of Quebec prohibiting another referendum on independence 
and any further measures to bring about the secession of Quebec from 
Canada. The government of Quebec objected, among other things, that no 
referendum had been called, and no question properly judicial was before 
the court. Yet Justice Robert Pidgeon held that the question was not neces-
sarily unripe, and not necessarily nonjusticiable. And so he denied the 
motion to dismiss46. Thereupon, the attorney general of Quebec and his 
entourage respectfully left the court and declined to plead further. 
43. SIR W. BLACKSTONE, op. cit., note 13, Vol. 1, at 245. 
44. Rediffusion Ltd. v. Hong Kong, [1970] A. C. 1136. 
45. The classic case to this effect, taught in every elementary course on Canadian constitu-
tional law, is Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver General of New 
Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437. 
46. Bertrand c. Begin, [1996] R.J.Q. 2393 (C.S.). 
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We have on the record of history two very remarkable declarations in 
or of the provincial Legislature of Quebec. 
On the day after the wreckage of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, the 
premier of Quebec made a resonant speech. Bourassa was quiet, sober, 
patient, and moderate, no firebrand at all, and not a separatist at heart. Yet 
he said : 
Le Canada anglais doit comprendre d'une façon très claire que, quoiqu'on dise et 
quoiqu'on fasse, le Québec est aujourd'hui et pour toujours, une société distincte, 
libre et capable d'assumer son destin et son développement. [Emphasis supplied] 
And in the spring of 1996, so as to make plain what is coming, regardless 
of judicial decrees, Bouchard's government introduced a motion, and, ac-
cordingly, it was resolved : 
L'Assemblée nationale réaffirme que le peuple du Québec est libre d'assumer son 
propre destin, de déterminer, sans entrave, son statut politique, et d'assurer son 
développement économique, social, et culturel. [Emphasis supplied] 
In proceedings before Pidgeon, Bertrand argued that, although interna-
tional law recognizes the right of a colony in some circumstances to with-
draw from an empire, it does not acknowledge the right of a part of an 
integrated nation or of a confederacy of states to withdraw from the whole47. 
Yet, Quebec has already been judicially treated as a colony of Canada. 
And the scope of the right of a people to autonomy under international law 
is still much debated. While international law may not affirm, it surely does 
not deny the right of a people within a country to secede. For international 
law does recognize the reality of a new nation when it emerges48. 
In the autumn of 1996, only weeks after the attorney general of Quebec 
departed from Pidgeon's court, Chretien's government caused the governor 
general to invoke Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, thereby referring to 
the Supreme Court of Canada the question, among others, « whether the 
national assembly, legislature, or government of Quebec, under the consti-
tution of Canada, has a right to proceed unilaterally toward secession of 
Quebec from Canada ». 
The Chief Justice of Canada has meanwhile denied the request of 
the justice minister and attorney general in Chretien's government for an 
accelerated hearing. 
47. Bertrand probably sought to anticipate H. BRUN and G. TREMBLAY, op. cit., note 22, 
pp. 371-372, who assert the constitutional right of a province to secede from Canada, 
notwithstanding the want of a formal mechanism, on the basis of an incontestable 
expression of public will in a free and peaceable election, political wisdom, and interna-
tional law. 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheaton 610 (U.S. 1818). 
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The answer to the question, so far as the court can address it, is that 
there is no express provision allowing Quebec to secede from Canada under 
any of the Constitution Acts from 1867 through 1982. 
But this answer is not the whole answer, and leaves out the most 
important point, which is that the principle of the Glorious Revolution came 
to Canada through the Preamble of the British North America Act of 1867. 
The principle not only arrived, but it now operates in a manner incapa-
ble of judicial articulation, as politicians in Ottawa temporize, expecting 
judges to do for them what only statesmanship on their part, buttressed by 
patriotism and courage, can accomplish for Canada. 
The principle gives the people of Quebec, through their elected govern-
ment, a right frankly revolutionary, but a right peaceable and lawful, and a 
right acknowledged in constitutional tradition, to take charge of their des-
tiny and development and to determine their national status49 in extraordi-
nary circumstances which, in the nature of things, cannot be judicially 
ascertained, prohibited, or remedied. 
All understand that the advantages of continental union are great, and 
that conveniences may be lost to Quebec and Canada if such union is not 
repaired and maintained. But there is more to life than worldly advantages 
and conveniences. And if a continental union is not a continental friendship, 
it can only be an instrument of oppression in the hands of whatever majority 
should gain control of the federal structure. Such a friendship can only be 
repaired and maintained by real statesmen of honor, never by politicians 
making specious arguments and ominous threats, least of all by force of 
arms, or by inappropriate appeals to judicial power. 
49. The formalities necessary for carrying out such transformations according to the prin-
ciple of the Glorious Revolution, as adapted to circumstances of British parliamentary 
government in North America, are hardly without precedent. See, e.g., the observations 
of Judge W. STAPLES, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress, (New York : DaCapo 
Press, 1971) at 65-67. 
